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(1) On March 21, a special three-judge federal court panel in Philadelphia began hearing testimony in a

proceeding to determine the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"). L[] The
statute, enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, L2J criminalizes the transmission of
"indecent" and "patently offensive" material via the Internet in a manner that makes it available to minors.
Judicial review of the CDA is destined to result in a landmark Supreme Court decision defining, for the
first time, the applicability of the First Amendment to emerging interactive communications media. As the
courts begin to grapple with this complex issue, three distinct areas will need to be examined: the
technical feasibility of regulating online speech; the jurisdictional limitations of such regulatory actions;
and the difficulty of defining "indecency" in a global, interactive medium.

I. Technical Feasibility
(2) Much of the testimony in the Philadelphia proceeding 13M is directed toward the technical aspects of
the Internet and computer-mediated communications. The process of educating the court on the
intricacies of cyberspace included the first demonstration of the Internet and the World Wide Web ever
presented in open court. An understanding of the technology is crucial, as it will enable the court to
determine whether any online content provider can realistically comply with the CDA. Indeed, it was
Congress' lack of this technical knowledge that led to the enactment of a statutory scheme that bears little
resemblance to the reality of how information is distributed on the Internet. The statute's legislative
history reveals that the CDA grew out of an effort to "update" existing telephone "dial-a-porn" laws to

make them applicable to the computer environment. No hearings were held, and Congress clearly
misunderstood the nature of the Internet and employed faulty analogies to other forms of media.
{3} The distinguishing characteristic of online communications is that the end-user must specifically seek
a particular piece of information. Unlike television or radio, which is "broadcast" to all users
simultaneously, the Internet is a universe of information that is available for the taking when and if a
particular user chooses to access it. In this way, the medium is far more analogous to a library. Just as a
librarian can not be expected to determine the age and identity of all patrons accessing a particular book
in the librarys collection, the provider of online information cannot be expected to police the usage of his
or her online offerings. To impose such a requirement would, as CDA opponents note, result in reducing
the content of online material to only that which is suitable for children.
{4} Censorship proponents counter this proposition by asserting that technological means could be
developed that would enable online content providers to identify potential users and thereby determine
their ages. Indeed, the legislation, if allowed to stand, would require the development of such "identity"

technologies. To avoid potential criminal liability under the "indecency" provision, information providers
would, in effect, be required to verify the identities and ages of all recipients of material that might be
deemed inappropriate for children. The new statutory regime would thus result in the creation of
"registration records" for tens of thousands of Internet sites, containing detailed descriptions of
information accessed by particular recipients. These records would be accessible to law enforcement
agencies and prosecutors investigating alleged violations of the statute. t4] Such a system would
constitute a gross violation of Americans' rights to access information privately and anonymously.
{5} Less than a year ago, the Supreme Court upheld the right to anonymous speech in Mclntvre v. Ohio
Elections Commission. [J The Court's rationale in that case applies with even greater force to the
Internet "indecency" provisions. The Court noted that: "the decision in favor of anonymity may be
motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a
desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible.. ." J6] "Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny
of the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in
particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation -- and their ideas from suppression -- at the

hand of an intolerant society."

17]

(6} Whether the millions of individuals visiting sites on the Internet are seeking information on teenage
pregnancy, AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, classic works of literature or avant-garde
poetry, they enjoy a Constitutional right to do so privately and anonymously. The CDA seeks to destroy
that right. The technological means to comply with the statute, through identifying individual users, does
not currently exist. To require the development and deployment of such technology would render the
Internet the most highly regulated form of communications the world has ever seen, and one that would
surely run counter to the principles of the First Amendmernt and a democratic society.
II.Jurisdictional Limitations
(7) One of the most glaring flaws in the logic underlying the CDA is in the drafters' failure to recognize
the global nature ofthe Internet. Even assuming that technological means of compliance could be
developed and found to be constitutionally permissible, the statute would only influence the practices of
content providers physically situated within the United States. Foreign providers, or even U.S. interests
who elect to move their operations off-shore, would be immune from prosecution.
(8) Such territorial realities, of course, apply to all legislative attempts to regulate behavior in a given

jurisdiction. But in the context of the Internet, this reality will unquestionably defeat the legislative intent
to regulate the content available to users within the United States. As the judicial panel in Philadelphia
learned during its online tutorial, a given web page can contain links to sites located in the United States
and those located abroad. A user can access information physically stored in Amsterdam or Bangkok as
easily as data stored in his or her hometown. For this reason, governmental attempts to regulate content
in the electronic realm bear little resemblance to similar efforts undertaken in other contexts. The Federal
Communications Commission can effectively regulate the content carried by broadcast outlets located in
the United States. Likewise, the Customs Service can control the importation of obscene printed material
across our borders. Because it knows no similar physical limitations, the Internet cannot be regulated
effectively at the source of online information.
{9} Does this mean that there is no means for controlling the content of material potentially available to
users within the United States? Not at all. Software currently exists that enables the user to block or
screen particular Websites, newsgroups, or other areas they don't wish to access. Parents, for instance,
can determine the types of content they deem appropriate for their children. This approach, in the opinion
of most experts, is the only effective means for creating a "child- friendly" online experience. The CDA
approach, on the other hand, will chill the free speech rights of Americans while doing little to remove
inappropriate material from the reach of minors.

III. The Difficulty of Defining "Indecency"
{10) Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the technological and jurisdictional barriers could be
overcome, the courts must finally address the question of what sorts of information are "indecent" and
"patently offensive," such that their transmission should constitute a criminal offense. While the
constitutional intricacies of this question are of such complexity that they go beyond the scope of this
brief discussion, a few relevant points can be raised. First, it must be recognized that the CDA
criminalizes the transmission of far more than obscenity. The legislation's proponents frequently cite
examples of"child pornography" and "obscene material" that can be found on the Internet. But they fail
to acknowledge that the distribution of such material is already illegal under existing federal obscenity
law. LJ Indeed, several high-profile cases during the year prior to the enactment of the CDA,
demonstrate that law enforcement authorities possess adequate tools to investigate and prosecute in such
cases. The CDA addresses material that falls within the vague category of "indecent" and "patently
offensive."
(11) In FCC v. Paci ca Foundation,1.] the Supreme Court held the so - called "seven dirty words" to
be "indecent" and thus subject to regulation in the context of broadcast media. The Court's analysis
focused on the "pervasive" nature of that medium and the fact that listeners or viewers are "assaulted" by
the content broadcast on radio or television. As Justice Powell observed, "broadcasting -- unlike most
other forms of communication -- comes directly into the home, the one place where people ordinarily
have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds." As previously noted,
interactive computer communications do not "assault" users -- particular information is specifically
sought and accessed. The difference in these media can best be understood by examining the facts in
Pacifica.The FCC action occurred after a father complained that he was listening to the radio with his
young son and the "dirty words" were suddenly broadcast with warning. It is difficult to imagine a similar
"assault" on the Internet.
{12) If one were to analogize the Internet to another medium, the world of printed publications seems far
more apt than does the world of broadcast. Yet the First Amendment clearly would not countenance the
criminalization of "indecent" or "patently offensive" speech in books or newspapers. This is because the

terms are inherently vague and invite government regulation of unpopular forms of expression in the
absence of a compelling governmental interest. If the First Amendment means anything, it is that the
government should not be in the business of regulating speech -- under threat of incarceration -- that

some might find "indecent" or "offensive." Such determinations are properly made by the individual and,
specifically in the context of the issue the CDA seeks to address, the parent.

IV. Conclusion
(13) For the reasons outlined above, it is likely that the courts will find the Communications Decency Act
to be violative of the First Amendment. Does this mean that we will be left with no method of ensuring
that children do not have ready access to inappropriate material online? Of course not. As mentioned,
software solutions currently exist that can empower parents to tailor the online experience they feel is
appropriate for their children. This is an area of technology that is rapidly expanding and is likely to
provide even greater controls in the near future. There is another possible approach. Kf as the censorship
advocates say, parents want their children to experience online communications but worry about the
adult-oriented content they might encounter, there ought to be a substantial market for alternative
services. How about "Families Online," a closed system where content is strictly regulated and parents
can opt out of Usenet or World Wide Web access. Or perhaps the service could provide "filtered"
Internet access, permitting connections to only those areas that have been pre-approved by the system's
administrators. Interestingly, these are the very techniques that the censorship advocates would like to
impose on the entire Internet. They're free to create such an oasis of their own, but why should the entire
global communications network be reduced to the level of what they find "appropriate" under threat of
prosecution?
(14) Such an approach would be consistent with the way the First Amendment is supposed to work. You
don't ask the government to censor speech that you find offensive; you create an alternative.
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